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Resumo
Este artigo analisa a medida em que algumas
discussões recentes na teoria política e social têm
sido bem sucedidas em fornecer discursos que
legitimam a ruptura de fronteiras nacionais/estatais
(internas e externas). Isto está claramente evidente
na Europa de hoje, uma Europa mista de estados
grandes e pequenos. Duas das mais publicamente
disseminadas discussões incluem por um lado o debate
tão familiar sobre a globalização e por outro a própria
teoria política, onde os temas são ou controvérsias
sobre o nacionalismo e autodeterminação, ou o
multiculturalismo, os direitos de grupos, a chamada
política da diferença e a noção emergente da
sociedade civil e associações civis.
Palavras-chave:
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Summary:
This paper examines to what extent some recent
discussions in political and social theory have been
successful in providing discourses that legitimize the
breaking up of modem (internal and external) national-
state frontiers. This is more clearly evident in Europe
today, a mixed Europe of large and small states. Two
of the most publicly disseminated such discussions
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include on the one hand the all too familiar debates
on globalization, and on the other political theory
proper where the subject matters are either
controversies over nationalism and self-determination,
or multiculturalism, group rights the so-called politics
of difference and the emergent notion of civil society
and civil associations.
Keywords:
Politics, Ethics, Challenge, State
I
The sort of division that the title refers to has to
do with the splitting of the unitary concept of the
national, politically sovereign, territorially
circumscribed and juridically autonomous state into
two coexisting but mutually antithetical senses: ethical
and political. This process is a particularly complicated
one as far as small states are concerned. What this
amounts to is the rejection of the erstwhile dominant
and exclusively political thesis that the borders of a
state are not themselves efficient causes of injustice
(or justice, for that matter, for this thesis must be
phrased as a symmetry claim): i.e. that they are
causally irrelevant. It has somehow appeared that
the preeminence of the political silences any ethical
claims. Yet, disquietude about state borders results in
disquietude about the borders of the concept of the
state itself.
Such a rejection (qualified or not) or at least a re-
consideration of the supposed naturalness of this thesis
above (that state borders are not themselves relevant
to discussions of justice) comes from a variety of
sources: the stark reality of world economic conditions,
academic theory, bureaucratic politics, as well as
various societal movements.
This paper examines to what extent some recent
discussions in political and social theory have been
successful in providing discourses that legitimise the
breaking up of modern (internal and external) national-
state frontiers. This is more clearly evident in Europe
today, a mixed Europe of large and small states. Two
of the most publicly disseminated such discussions
include on the one hand the all too familiar debates
on globalization, and on the other political theory
proper where the subject matters are either
controversies over nationalism and self-determination,
or multiculturalism, group rights the so-called politics
of difference and the emergent notion of civil society
and civil associations. It is evident that all these topics
directly involve the notion of the state and its
legitimacy as traditionally encapsulating the
‘naturalness’ of territorial-cum-juridical borders. Since
it is obviously impossible to actually discuss these
points here, I must emphasize that, as it will become
clear presently, my discussion is about the required
presuppositions for such discussions to be of any
value.
Demands for a certain kind of unification
(economic, political, cultural) across Europe are
increasingly being the subject matter of social-
scientific discourses, and inevitably of bureaucratic
attention (e.g. immigration policies, environmental
protocol agreements) as well as the focus of political
vision and battleground (primarily articulated by the
emergence of the ‘new’ social movements). These
three diverse activities or modes of conceiving the
transcending of state borders–theoretical discourse,
bureaucratic and government policy, and public debate
and protest–are predictably not always in harmony
with each other.
It is one of the claims of this paper that social and
political theory (the first of these three discourses)
must deal with, and accommodate, this divergence
of visions,  voices and practices. In particular, in order
to do so in a viable manner, social and political theory
must look closely to how these different modes handle
the problem of nationalism as it relates to the wider
questions of democracy and justice. This paper
cannot, of course, go into an examination of all theories
of nationalism and ethnic identity, nor of democracy
and justice. But it looks at some relevant issues from
a particular standpoint that throws into relief the
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problem of state frontiers in its entirety: that is, the
controversy between the universality of the modem
demand for justice across borders and its antithesis,
i.e. the political demand for the primacy of sovereignty
and self-determination. This is therefore the backbone
of this paper: the uneasy relationship between the
demands of global justice or universalistic
morality that does not stop at national borders,
on the one hand, and the particularistic politics
of democratic decision-making, citizenship
participation, and protection of minority rights on
the other, that is, practices necessarily
circumscribed within the confines of the national
state or the territorially circumscribed juridical
sovereign state whose borders are barriers of
rights and obligations.
So what the approach I am proposing as the more
fruitful for dealing with the matter at hand involves a
route that appears to be indirect: in order to discuss
how social and political theory can accommodate the
divergent voices of public policy makers and social
movements, etc; we must look at nationalism and its
attendant issues; in turn, we cannot look into the latter
unless we analyse the concept of state as tom
between the demands of ethical universalism and
political particularism. That is, the concept of the state
appears to be losing its own borders.
That sovereign states are commonly thought to
be under two mutually incompatible demands or duties
is exacted by their new double role1. This role
(increasingly complicated in the case of small states)
asks us to view states, and by extension their borders,
not simply as political entities circumscribed in political-
juridical terms solely (first role), but also as bearers
of ethical or cultural claims (second role): for instance
one way in which we may detect the latter ‘moralizing’
or ‘culturalizing’ role is in demands that states are
cultural entities themselves (to be protected) or in
(anti-’realist’) demands for states to assume an ethical
role in international affairs (e.g. by means of practising
humanitarian intervention or assuming responsibility
for the setting up of international human rights
tribunals–all these being examples where the state,
as opposed to the individual person, is ascribed moral
responsibility and duties; usually this trend involves,
not surprisingly, the similar issue of minority (cultural
and ethnic) group-rights, such groups being one just
case of the overall trend for ascribing rights and duties
to collective entities in opposition to the traditional
liberal thesis in favour of the individual being the sole
bearer of such rights.
This phenomenon has emaciated the concept of
the political as traditionally embodied in the state and
has thus transformed the state by enmeshing it with
the civic polity. There are at least two main ways this
is taking place: either the notion and practice of the
political, itself, is being asked to be shared by agencies
and institutions other that the traditional centralized
juridical state (e.g. proposals in favour of dispersed
sovereignty within each state), or alternatively the
state itself acquires a double role, as just explained.
Therefore, it is the upshot of this paper that the
question of ethnic and other identities forcing the
breakdown of state frontiers must be seen as
presupposing the prior question of the frontiers
of the very concept of the state itself.
The three platforms or discourses mentioned above
– social and political theory, bureaucratic and
governmental policy, and new social movements–are
engaged, in different ways, in addressing this very
question: that is, what the concept of the modem state
must circumscribe. Each of these three approaches,
given its own specific nature, is of course doing this
reworking of the concept of the state in various
degrees of conscious intention. Nevertheless,
whichever way each of these platforms looks at it
(past the initial starting point, i.e. the issue of the day,
providing merely the occasion for a re-kindling of the
wider questions of nationalism and the boundaries of
the political state), the way the questions are posed
and the manner in which plausible modes of discussion
and controversy are evaluated by each side involved,
are all inexorably linked with the more foundational
question of the relationship between ethics and politics.
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Diverse proposals of how to handle the opposite
pulls of each side of this relationship (i.e .
cosmopolitanism or universalism vs. particularism),
however, different or one-sided each position accuses
the other to be in arbitrarily privileging one of them
(i.e. the universality of ethics over political
particularism and vice versa), they are both bound to
end up by throwing into relief this double sense (or
the two roles) of the concept of the state. Thus
dividing (or internally multiplying, rather) the character
of the political state between the universalistic
demands of ethics (e.g. global economic reallocation
of resources across national borders, etc.) on the one
hand, and those of particularistic politics on the other
(e.g. as widely different as nationalism, national self-
determination, multicuIturalism, or the politics of
difference, all of which privilege difference, singularity
and identity as politically justifying borders), ends up
by asking too much of this ‘mongrel’ or hybrid new
state. Not that national states of the classical
Westphalian type were ever really and consistently
true to form and avant la letter-nor was, of course,
the core concept in this picture, i.e. that of state
sovereignty ever what it was to be in international
relations, far from it2.
But there reigned at least what it may be called a
‘hegemonic misconception’ or a kind of international
‘mauvaix fois’ (by no means an illusion, though, since
what was believed to be so, was, in the nature of
things, really so by being perceptually constructed).
What was this dominant misconception about? It was
mainly an expression of the self-assured belief that
state politics and ethics were distinct in bureaucratic
and policy makers’ circles. If that has been exposed
as a realistic naiveté or as something no longer
applicable to modern conditions or as an downright
wrong argument in general,3 such a castigation does,
nevertheless, little in the way of replacing the
debunked paradigm by a plausible (in this case, anti-
realist) alternative if it neglects to tackle the problem
of the relationship between ethics an politics4.
That is replacing one paradigm by another does
not solve problems. But the issue of what it has here
been called the state’s new ‘double role’ requires the
realization that this double role is new. It is so, I would
contend, because unlike the past when the
legitimate source of policy-making was left
uncontested by inner (i.e. intra-state) movements
(esp. as far as designing foreign policy was
concerned)–this is no longer the case. Now, in
contemporary post-industrial conditions, the autonomy
of statesmanship and policy-making is contested not
only by economic globalization, but also by political
and social theory within the academia but also
elsewhere, as well as by particularist values put
forward by nationalism, new social movements, the
politics of difference and recognition, multiculturalist
claims for special group rights, and disintegrating
tendencies in policy-making pursued by growing
tendencies towards civil associations. I shall place
emphasis on the latter as major factors in such a
change of scenery, i.e. I shall take social theory and
the particularist claims just listed as two principal new
corners, and treat the other factor, economic
globalization, at least for my purposes here, only as
an empirical backdrop or a standing condition.
If the emergence and growing public voice of new
social movements and alternative politics are being
increasingly visible, it might be asked how could social
theory or political philosophy be of any comparable
value here. Political and social theory may be seen
as entering the stage by being seeped into both
political elites’ legitimation discourses, no less than in
the area of social movements themselves or group
activism and the like where one would naturally
expect such seeping through processes to be more
clearly accommodated5. I cannot say more about the
strategic importance of political and social theorizing
for either governmental policy or social and other group
activism here. I only wish to point out that we must
not neglect it. We must study its pivotal influence (even
Morgenthau, traditionally but misleadingly classified
as the arch-realist, has also pointed this out). One
area for studying this is nationalism and the related
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issue of citizenship in the Europe of ED and in a world
of functional interdependencies. By doing this we
come back full circle to the background question of
demarcating the relationship between ethics and
politics again. To see this we may first look into the
ever-growing realization that political philosophy,
explicitly linked to ethics, has occupied centre stage
in academic discourses while, at the same time,
capturing a much wider audience. I shall briefly come
back to this at the beginning of the next section and
then move on in the rest of that section and more
fully in the subsequent sections, by way of illustrating
all this, to the more localized and specific issue of
how to accommodate the demands of justice (taken
as the marker of ethical universalism) to those of
democracy as a mechanism for decision-making
(taken as the marker of political particularism: vide,
e.g., the revealing notion of ‘popular sovereignty’
unreservedly particularistic) where questions of
nationalism, national self-determination,
multiculturalism, and the politics of difference are an
important ingredient.
The first area in which I develop this has to with
the question of whether the erosion of state borders
by means of global interconnectedness (from the
outside, as it were) should spell disaster for the
prospects of an enhanced sense of active citizenship
or not (let us call this the external viewpoint). The
second area would be a cluster of issues from within
the internal perspective of a single nation state: e.g.
whether the erosion of internal borders of monolithic
sovereignty centred on government is underway by
means of the emergence of nationalism or group
rights, or alternatively, by the political demands of civil
associations to have a saying in what matters to their
domain (internal viewpoint). The discussion shall not
be proposing solutions it will only touch on these
issues from the standpoint of the background question
of the new double role expected of states. Moreover,
the two sets of issues or areas are by no means
disconnected regions in which issues of justice and
democracy (first set) or of nationality and citizenship
(second set) are being separately contested. On the
contrary, they are interconnected. This can be seen
once the analysis of each is actually developed.
Nevertheless, as a foretaste, one can easily discern
this interconnectedness between the external and the
internal viewpoints–the external and internal attacks
on the boundaries of the autonomous traditional state-
by reflecting on just one issue: e.g. the question of
evaluating what is called deliberative or republican
democracy (so much in vogue nowadays) in relations
to attacks centring on principles of liberal neutrality
and pluralism, or on the ideas of the politics of
recognition and individuality. Taking a stand with
respect to this type of republican democratic politics
and citizenship hinges foremost on the question
whether the primary essence of such deliberative
processes of democracy is to be particularistic in
scope and content (e.g. local issues are best discussed
at local level etc.) –thus not surpassing national
borders, hence not amenable to cosmopolitan
universalism even of an instrumental kind. (In this
way it also clashes with globalized or ‘E. Unionised’
processes of centralized decision-making) At the same
time this of course puts in question the value of hoping
for a new type of citizen emerging, the so-called global
or ‘pilgrim’ citizen (in R. Falk’s phrase).6
II
Before discussing some of the issues, which arise
both in terms of the internal, and the external borders
of modern states, in this section I wish to make clearer
this relationship between the demands of ethics and
the claims of politics. In the next sections I shall be
looking at some more specific questions of how
nationalism, national and cultural identity, and
globalization and citizenship are all linked with the
double erosion of the territorially autonomous state
and the downfall of the supposed solidity of its borders.
In recent decades philosophical discussions of
ethics and developments in political and social theory
not only have they begun to converge but they more
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often than not stress the importance of questions in
which both ethics and politics are involved. Similarly,
in non-academic public discourse and the politics of
protest as well as in public policy areas there is a
growing awareness of the link of moral questions with
political issues, at least more so compared to the days
in which ‘realism’ in international politics, or balance
of power politics and the like did not allow any serious
place to moral concerns in politics. However, I am
not sure that this growing concern for an explicit
interrelationship between moral concerns and theories
of ethics on the one hand, and political issues and
theories of justice or democracy or globalization on
the other, have attended explicitly and directly to what
seems to me to be a more basic issue, underlying the
more specific or surface issues of politics and ethics:
that is the prior and general question of the
relationship between ethics and politics as such, rather
than between specific questions or theoretical
problems between them. Quite often there is a lot of
discussion about the relation between ethical demands
and aspirations conflicting with political realities or
pressing political issues–as is the case, most
prominently, when the claims of ethical universalism
and ethical particularism are debated against political
problems such as self-determination, nationalism, non-
interventionism and sovereignty, or the advantages
of democratic institutions. All these issues put to
question the idea of state borders as supposedly
beyond dispute, as a legitimate closure.
What we are usually presented with in these cases
are bona fide moral conflicts or tragic dilemmas of
incompossible duties, unrankable values and the like,
or in other words a clash between what ethics enjoins
and what politics requires (e.g. conflicts between the
moral character of demands for national self-
determination or the protection of minority rights as a
universal consideration on the one hand, and the
politics of particularized, state-bound, citizenship on
the other; or environmental concerns of impartial
morality whose scope is the whole of humanity
classing with claims to special treatment and
exemption in favour of economically disadvantaged
populations). But even when they reach deep down
into the depths of theory or into the foundations of
both disciplines, all these discussions are,
nevertheless, conducted at a level where the prior
question is not really touched on, or not at least
indirectly and as a corollary.
What I mean by this prior question can best be
explained by means of the idea of moral conflict
already introduced: in cases of such systematic and
persistent conflicts it seems that the resources of
ethical theories are unable to furnish us with generally
acceptable and irreversible or final decision-
mechanisms as to their resolution; meanwhile, it
appears to be the case that political theory may offer,
under suitable conditions, the grounds for resolving
conflicts. At other times, however, it appears that
ethics sets both the agenda and the ultimate ends to
be valued so that political theory must accommodate
itself, or be judged in accordance to them: in this case
ethics appears prior to politics. Therefore, in the
inevitable enmeshment of ethics with politics the prior
question that must be asked or perhaps the end
question towards which we must be working (via
more specific topics) is this issue of priority or primacy
of each discourse.
In this sense, this paper has two aims in view or
two questions to answer. Although, of course, this is
still a research in progress, and I can by no means
claim to answer these two questions in all their details,
the discussion is geared towards two questions.
(I) One question, which we may call the ‘grand
or all-inclusive question’ at the background, is the
relation of priority or primacy between politics and
ethics.
(II) The other question (or rather cluster of related
issues) is the more specific one explicitly discussed
here and concerns various problems (a) encountered
when trying to accommodate together the demands
or ideals of justice and democracy in a world in which
national borders become increasingly permeable for
all sorts of reasons, and (b) issues relating to
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nationalism. Though this may not be an accurate
classification, we may say that the former type of
issues (a) refer to questions about what is happening
to the external borders of states in world economic
and political conditions, whereas the second set of
issues (b) are more tuned to the internal dimension,
that is whether the state is being eroded from the
inside. Let me put these two questions, the general
and the specific, in the context of this paper.
(I) The ‘grand’ question (of the relation of ethics
and politics) becomes more particularized by
contextualizing it to the set of issues (a) more
specifically (I shall be doing the same with type (b)
issues later). The ‘grand question’ in our context
becomes: Is (political) Democracy merely a means
serving the ends set by (ethical) Justice? In this case,
the question is whether politics must be seen as
serving (or ought to serve) ethics, respectively. And
further, keeping in mind the three platforms or
discourses of this paper (social theory, policy making,
protest movements) the question just posed asks in
effect the relationship of ethics and politics be seen
as central to these three discourses (whether some
or most of its participants are not willing to admit).
Two particularized ways of dealing with our ‘grand’
question are: (i) is democracy a good, bad, indifferent,
efficient or not, political mechanism for meeting the
ethical demands of justice worldwide (external
borders) as well as with demand of justice internally
with respect, say, to the rights of minority cultures or
recognition politics? The other specific way of dealing
with our general question is: (ii) which conception of
democracy or primary type of democratic institution
best suits this purpose of impartial morality advocated
by justice across national borders? (Notice that the
latter question phrased in this way may be seen as
loading the dice in favour of certain substantive
principles of justice as opposed to others).
(II) This second, particular, question becomes in
our context this: in the case of permeable national
borders or conflicting internal (i.e. within a nation
state) identity borders, how could adherence to
democratic principles help us solve conflicts arising
from, or leading to, phenomena such as demands for
self-determination or immigration? Or which specific
type of democratic institutions should be preferred
(against others) in dealing with issues such as these
or other similar and related ones?
It should be noted that especially in dealing with
the subissue of internal identity borders, there may
appear two ways in which the erstwhile sovereignty
uniquely enjoyed by states may be eroded: either
nationally-homogeneous but politically active and
contestatory civic associations may be positing limits
to state action; or alternatively, nationally-
heterogeneous associations, differing ethnic and
cultural groups or simply formally unorganized sets
of sentiments (such as diverse cultural or linguistic
identities) acting as a focal point for relevant
communities to be formed around them may also be
positing barriers to the exclusivity of state sovereignty.
In all these cases, a number of claims originating
as ethical claims of justice dictate a fresh re-thinking
of the scope, type and power of democratic
institutions, i.e. ethics lays down the agenda for political
theory. Given, that is, the permeability of national
borders and globalising economies, our concern to
meet ethical claims to justice must necessarily justify
restricting state functions, thus curbing its traditional
political and juridical character (both internally and
externally). In other words, ethics directs the stage
of inevitable conceptual transformations that we must
accept in our times: politics is losing one of its
traditional loci and must thus redelineate one for itself
but in doing so one of the items in the agenda that
need reconsidering is the idea of democracy (I am
not of course claiming that rethinking democracy is
something new or something that is brought about in
the way 1 have just described; 1 am only indicating
yet another way why democracy must be
reconsidered, as a byproduct of the prior, more basic,
reconsideration of how ethics does (and must?) affect
theories of politics. This is of utmost practical
importance as far as the two of the platforms being
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used in this paper are concerned (i.e. government
and bureaucratic policy making and social
movements), for unless they realize the importance
of at least being able to appreciate the question of
the relation of ethics and politics or the primacy of
the one over the other, their debates, decision-making
as well as their general ideological approach to
everyday issues would be fuzzy and inconsistent. This
would rather exacerbate the problems of incoherence
worldwide and tensions, e.g. of local ethnic type, would
accelerate becoming well-embedded agents of larger
proportion constantly endangering world peace,
without thereby solving the question of the legitimacy
of state borders and the absolute claims of juridical
sovereignty.
Before going into the more specific discussion 1
should somewhat anticipate later conclusions by
indicating here an interesting reversal of roles.
Demands of social and economic justice may be
initially taken as ethically universalistic in origin (i.e.
all human beings are entitled to them, irrespective of
national citizenship); while, by contrast, democracy
can be initially seen to be a purely political and thus a
particularistic process of institutionalized and regulated
decision-making (particularistic, that is, in at least the
sense that such a rule-guided process is traditionally
nation-bound in the source of its legitimacy, locally
efficient in its scope, restricted in its ability to control
certain outcomes rather than others, and so on). In
this sense, we have, prima facie, one species of
opposition between ethics and politics. The moral claim
of: say, global egalitarianism that the value of justice
may posit, clashes with ideals of citizenship, national
independence, territorial autonomy, and the like that
democracy must inevitably honour. In a word, the
ethics of justice conflicts with democratic politics.
Yet there has always been a tension to invert the
roles of these two values, justice and democracy, by
making, on the one hand democracy extended in
intension so that its primary features as a regulated
process of decision-making become universalistic
values desirable as applicable to all humanity; and on
the other hand, claims of social and economic justice
can be detached from their universalistic enveloping
and be recast as particularist demands justified or
satisfied only in circumscribed, political, contexts.
What is more, in this latter case demands of social
and economic justice may even be pushed down one
more level from being locatable at the level of the
state or interstate politics to the level of contestatory
politics carried out by microassociations of various
sorts, or alternatively, as ethical claims, still, but now
firmly placed within the camp of ethical particularism.
In all these senses, democracy starts as an
institutionalized means and ends as an ethical
desideratum to be universalised across boundaries,
whereas justice starts as an ethical universal and
is transformed to a variously particularised and
fragmented series of purposes best served by
principles such as representation, accountability,
majority-rule, etc. This can be best seen, 1 suggest,
when justice and democracy are discussed from the
perspective of national borders since traditionally the
latter are the means whereby particularism is
legitimized by empowering the political over above
the ethical.
III
One of the issues associated with universalistic
ethics or the demand for the establishment of a
cosmopolitan order is that traditional political
sovereignty centred on nation states and carried out
through their governments is put in jeopardy. We do
not have to elaborate either the theoretical explanation
of this or how the phenomenon of globalising
interconnectedness practically assists in this. In view
of other actors usurping traditional roles from states
(such as transnational organizations, multinational
corporations, capital movement itself, and the like) it
is sometimes held (perhaps in despair) that some roles
still left for states to play despite the loss of full
autonomy may be educating the public to accept
internationalism or something to that effect. Though
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I do not think that this is ever possible, I would like to
look at a tangential issue: that is, the belief that
globalization may enhance democracy or democratic
sensitivities, or citizenship, etc. The puzzle, more fully,
is whether given the trimming of the powers of nation
states within which citizenship is exercized (at least
in its traditional form) and given that there is a
diminishing open space left to national policies to be
worthy of their name, does there remain a
considerable (and if so sufficient?) room for national
policy-making-despite even the facts of heightened
globalizing economic tendencies and realities? If so,
the second question following from this is whether
this is a welcome state of affairs as far as democratic
values are concerned or, in other words, could we
expect citizenship and the virtues of democracy
stemming from its exercise to be thwarted or
enhanced?7
To avoid generalities, I shall make some critical
points on this by looking specifically at a number of
ideas W. Kymlicka has put forward against the more
optimistic views of D. Held’s.8 In general I agree
with Kymlicka but I wish to go beyond his theses by
adding some further problems that his arguments must
take into account-thus incorporating the prospects of
democracy into the overall assessment. In the full
version of my paper I shall be making a detailed case,
so here I shall simply put down the main points.
(1) The first disagreement is whether national policy
has still some scope to operate and hence whether
domestic citizenship can be expected to be enhanced
or not. The affirmative position on this rests on two
distinct grounds, one empirical, the other normative
(though not distinguished as such). The former,
descriptive, question needs to be tested (I cannot do
this now). The second, the normative embracing and
approval of differences in how citizens respond in
nationally distinctive ways to globalised economic
forces (trespassing their national borders) or how
citizens “cherish this ability to deliberate and act as a
national collectivity”, etc., is a different matter
altogether. On the one hand, the fact that national
priorities are attached priority to, etc. does not
necessarily entail a heightened democratic sensitivity,
participation, or a sense of identity that unavoidably
flourishes by democratic mechanisms. Anti-
democratic, authoritarian impulses based on
alternative sources of identity (e.g. nationalism) may
be fostered and crystallised to an extent that
democratic participation is stifled or regarded as in
the end irrelevant or pernicious. A national issue uniting
a collectivity does not exclude the possibility of its
being transformed into a nationalist issue. Here
globalisation does not necessarily threaten, but neither
does is guarantee that democratic means prevail. On
the other hand, if we switch from democracy to justice,
nothing in all this is in any way an assurance that
issues of worldwide social justice are promoted or
solutions proposed and implemented (even if
democracy is granted). While in the previous case of
democracy globalizing effects may be ambivalent, here
they seem to win over the issue of social justice across
borders.
A second affirmative, optimistic, argument in
favour of the possibility of globalization enriching
national political life and offering ways for nation
states to affirm themselves points to the fact that
globalization allows new interest groups to
fill the gaps of political decision-making left open
by the trimming of traditional governmental
power. Again it is doubtful that unless certain
conditions are present such new intrusions into
the political will result in a deepening sense of
the value of democracy or democratic participation in
particular. All these welcomed developments show
that globalization may revitalise national identity
forging solidarity and providing commonality of
interests, etc., but it is not necessarily evidence that
democracy is thereby served either in the sense of a
freedom enhancing process or in the sense of
majority-rule being rescued from the danger of being
high - jacked by the tyranny of a consolidated majority’
or with being associated with anything but the
promotion of worldwide social justice.
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(2) A second bone of contention concerns the
prospects of cosmopolitan or transnational citizenship.
Assuming we all agree that principles of democracy
and respect for human rights cut across borders and
must thus guide relations between states, the further
step of demanding that the unambiguous presence of
these are indispensable criteria for granting
recognition or taking up economic relations with a
state leads us towards the beginnings of an argument
that takes us from the realm of democracy (rights,
freedom, etc.) to social justice across borders. But
here I am sceptical about the grounds of seeing nation
states (stable and homogeneous or otherwise) playing
such a role (against well-entrenched reasons of state,
security, and the like)–nor can we readily see, e.g.,
secessionist demands and separatist aspirations to sit
comfortably together with attempts to enhance
feelings of ‘community of interests or fate’ with all
the people of the world sufficient to call it a sense of
‘cosmopolitan citizenship’ .
But another negative or sceptical argument rests
on the implausibility or severely conditioned possibility
of ‘democratizing’ transnational organizations or
institutions (financial world markets?) other than
traditional states. What can these do in these respect?
Besides arguments to the effect that linguistically or
culturally heterogeneous communities by definition
lack required commonalities for an effective world-
citizens’ institutionalized deliberation process, the idea
that individual national citizens can enter and affect
such a worldwide deliberation process indirectly via
their national fora (thus safeguarding the
accountability of such transnational social entities)
poses a further problem: that of ending up with social
justice across borders losing over accountability.
Holding my national government accountable may
strengthen democracy internally and possibly at the
intergovernmental level but does not unequivocally
entail that I cherish or fight for cosmopolitan justice-
not, that is, without certain other conditions being
added on.
To the extent that we can make sense of
transnational democracy or community any proposal
of strengthening accountability of transnational
organizations and institutions indirectly at the national
level (as a bona fide instrument of impeccable
democratic pedigree) may take a variety of forms,
not all of which are enhancing democracy necessarily.
Decentred loci of debate and action within states are
no guarantee. Though I cannot argue further about
this, I believe we may turn to a reconsideration of a
Kantian-scheme of world peace whereby a dual
objective is simultaneously aimed at: external
federation but also at the same time internal
republicanism (we do not have to follow Kant’s exact
meaning on this), the latter implying the moral
improvement of human beings along universalist
ethical demands as an indispensable condition (I
explore this in another paper).
IV
I now come to discuss the second area or cluster
of issues from the standpoint we called the internal
viewpoint of the erosion of the autonomy of the
centralized juridical state.The issues here are more
complicated in the case of small homogeneous states
than in big, multicultural, ones. Here we are more
interested in how internal voices within a state put
forward claims for autonomy, or separate group rights,
and other such demands that seem to jeopardise the
erstwhile unitary sense of post-Westphalian state as
internally monolithic in its jurisdiction. In this area, of
course, the issues of nationalism, ethnicity, and national
self-determination and secession loom large. But so
do questions about a new type of citizenship which
for some appears to be more of the republican type
while for others it requires the embracing of the
liberating mechanisms and institutions associated with
novel types of civil associations (beyond traditional
political party-membership) as well as new social
movements and the politics of difference and
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recognition of individuality (that attack the
homogenising and rationalistic type of citizenship the
former advocates prefer). I shall again deal with only
a limited number of problems with a view of throwing
into relief again the background problem of
demarcating the borders of ethics and politics in their
mutual relationship.
One way in which the emaciated territorially
located state can be seen to be the outcome of forces
related to nationalism is by raising the issue of the
autonomy of the individual in the special case where
no sacrifices can legitimately be demanded of such
an individual by his or her government for the purpose
of pursuing universalist morality (e.g. humanitarian
military intervention in another country not of any
threat to one’s own and with the possible risk of one’s
own national soldiers dying in action, unconditional
‘open-borders’ immigration, public funds devoted to
environmental worldwide projects as opposed to local
schools, etc.) if such claims jeopardize the national
identity or national way of life. Let us use this principle
as our starting point and call it, with others, the upper
limit to cosmopolitan ideals. Now to do so means that
some notion of national identity or national way of
life is at play here, and whatever that may be
specifically, the important point in embracing the
principle is that such a notion of national identity is
raised, normatively, to a place above the state (and
consequently there is an upper limit to what kind of
international treaties the state’s government is allowed
to sign even for admirable worldwide aims of justice).
Given this, why is the idea of national identity so
important as to trump such state action? Why should
it not be changed? Many answers come to mind, all
more or less well known by now, but I shall here
follow one such classification because it reveals
something of interest to our discussion9. This proposal
acknowledges three possible candidates for the
worthiness of a national identity (and at this point we
may add ‘cultural’ or ‘religious’, etc., but the case is
better worked out if we deal with it as concerning a
national way of life that the state must not tamper
with). These three candidates are: (a) deep personal
relationships to other specified persons, (b) ground
projects, plans, ambitions and ideals for oneself and
one’s loved ones, and (c) loyalty to one’s own nation
state and compatriots.  Supposedly these three or any
combination thereof are sufficient to block any state
demands that may put them in danger.
Now what is interesting is the further claim that
only (a) provides good, defensible, strong, in a word
‘real’, reasons or principles for an individual citizen
to be able to legitimately resist any attempt to impose
cosmopolitan sacrifices on her or him (perhaps only
secondarily and in a very much weaker sense are
the other two considerations allowed to play the role
of blocking moral sacrifices). Why so? Briefly
because reasons of type (a) give people a concrete sense
of themselves, as elf-image they can adopt, and a
substance to carrying on living. Irrespective of whether
one agrees with this proposal or not, the question is:
what does this privileging of type (a) considerations over
(b) and (c) show for our purposes?
(i) What this proposal shows is that according to
this way of looking at the matter the stronger reasons
for one to resist an alteration (to what exactly? we
must be told) imposed by the demands of supra-
national, impersonal, morality is the most
‘individualistic’ or ‘individually’ and ‘personally’
framed ones. The first point to note here is that in
this way democracy trumps global justice. It does so
because the individualist standpoint (the deep personal
attachments) to specified others from whom one
ensures a meaning in life acquires more importance
than (b) and (c) types of reasons, which move towards
a more societal dimension. The latter do not seem to
be efficient legitimate blocks to what a state can
demand for purposes of justice. But this is a
contradiction, for in order to safeguard a value that is
avowedly social (such as the ‘national’ way of life)
we are asked to start our justification from an
individualistic basis.
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In addition, the deep personal-attachment thesis
does not by itself preclude
at this level of generality that its proponents insist
on keeping it-the possibility (and it may sometimes
be demanded even as a necessity) that caring, self-
image and the like that make up type (a) reasons are
the result of, or embody at their core, positive and
explicit attitudes towards ethical values of the
impersonal type that are supposed to be jettisoned by
the proponents of this thesis. Far from doing this, they
may moreover include along with the relevant ethical
values the corresponding political claims. For instance,
certain types of activism and social movements–
which are as a matter of fact paramount cases of
precisely such a mechanism of ensuring a self-image
and a type of caring for one–are not simply a matter
of fighting for such personal attachments without
basing them on certain human values that the activists
use to boost their arguments (and in some cases, some
of these, being of the liberal variety, clearly transcend
the boundaries of state politics). Even so, and without
regard to that, the danger of generalizing and
abstracting becomes evident if we consider groups
pursuing forms of politics of difference or even
religious groups, the members of which may feel
more close attachments (even if not exactly ‘personal’
in the strong sense of knowing and being able to
identify those others) to unknown but not unspecified
others of the same group allegiance internationally
across the globe and thus sympathize with them even
more deeply than with their conationals.
(ii) Now lets us turn to type (b) reasons for blocking
the demands of cosmopolitan ethics in favour of
enhanced state autonomy–that is, projects, plans and
ideals–and let us disregard now the question whether
these are inferior reasons compared to type (a) ones.
Is destroying or endangering one’s ground projects in
life a sufficient reason not to accept policies that
demand this in the name of an ethics across borders?
Following the terminology of those discussing this, let
us say that such ground life-projects are inexorably
enmeshed into social practices (beyond the individual
person, thus avoiding the charge of excessive
individualism put forward above). These social
practices are seen as a cluster of customs, traditions
and institutions that an individual finds oneself in and
strives to relate with. To get an immediate grip with
the problem here one may consider the example of a
society whose social practice traditionally involves
the destruction of the natural environment. Another
example may be the Varna system in India. Asking
individuals in such a culture to mend their ways may
be thought as involving the loss of any sense of self
as a result of the disappearance of well-understood
ground plans which the individual was ready and able
to pursue. Arguments against such a loss may be of
various sorts, but the principal idea is, briefly, that
people may be expected to be able to adjust to new
ways of life and altered social practices with new
customs, traditions and institutions. For instance,
people from other cultures immigrating into a differing
social practice in another country do not disintegrate.
Now my point here is that the interesting thing to
notice is a crucial sociological distinction that usually
gets ignored at this level of abstraction: there is a
vital and decisive distinction to be drawn between
affluent, industrial societies and the rest. It is natural
to expect that in the former type of societies people
do not so easily ‘short-circuit’ once the traditional
practices are altered and they are left with no familiar
ground plans to pursue or when their projects
sanctioned by the displaced customs are now
thwarted (if they ever are, and so drastically). On
the other hand, for those moving from their traditional
tribal societies to Finland, say, or for those who are
asked to drop their illiberal or environment-destroying
social practices by means of outside intervention in
the name of cosmopolitan morality, things are definitely
not so smooth. Moreover, the problem becomes more
intractable when we add the question of whether it is
permissible to impose such a change even if the
members of that culture do not wish to or do not
comprehend the reasons for it. Here we have of
course problems relating to democracy 10.
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Two corollaries follow from this discussion. The
first is that we cannot make a headway in these
matters unless we stop discussing them in abstract
terms without taking important sociological differences
into account. The second is that even if we opt for
strengthening the state’s legitimacy in the face of an
outside corrosion of its customs and traditions, the
result is still that the state becomes merely
instrumental in that role: customs and traditions are
the dominant values, while the political (embodied in
the actions of the state) is simply following suit. The
values of religion, community or cultural customs are
the guiding lights. By contrast, values such as
majoritarian democracy, deliberation, the relative
advantages of different voting systems, and more
generally jurisprudential notions and values such as
the legal organization of authority and enforcement
in juridically circumscribed sovereignty, in a word, all
sorts of concepts that are the backbone of the
distinctive legitimacy of political institutions become
secondary and merely instrumental.
The second major area of issues in this part that I
wish to touch upon has to with citizenship in relation
to demands by so-called radical multiculturalists and
the advocates of group difference and the politics of
recognition and the like. I am referring to demands
for special status of groups in the host state and
recognition of gender and other difference and
individuality that goes beyond mere toleration of the
minority11. I only have space for three comments.
First, I would like to point an interesting paradox
within the theories in favour of group difference that
must be preserved in their specificity eschewing
integration or marginalization into privacy. All such
theses are of course attacks against the idea of
sovereignty and the legitimacy of borders within which
majorities can impose their own values upon the
incoming ethnic minority or the already existing
cultural or sexual group. Not many decades after the
reign of the vehement romantic-individualist
denunciation and rejection of the ‘mass mentality’ and
the like, there appears now an urge to affirm and
vaunt one’s liberalism by means of espousing the
causes of ‘difference’ only as a matter of group
identity, and encouraging emancipatory movements
for the explicit articulation and recognition as social
groups (not just individuals). Yet these same advocates
of the primacy of group identity that must be
acknowledged politically in new forms of citizenship
that transform the old type of state policies are the
first to ‘celebrate’ the fragmentation of modem civil
society. They are also the first to thereby attack all
ideological schemas such as e.g. nationalism which
try falsely and hypocritically, according to these
advocates, to foster a sense of commonality solidarity,
oneness, permanence and the like. That is, whatever
the advocates of radical multiculturalism disapprove
of in their opponents are precisely the items in their
agenda that they most cherish: the solidarity and
permanence of grouping. After all, in their view, the
very purpose of politics is to affirm group difference.
They might reply that their principles of ‘grouping’
are different, not modelled on their opponents’
hierarchical, authoritarian or homogenizing type; rather
their principles leave group-members free,
autonomous and constantly re-negotiating their
relevant identity. But hardly any serious-minded
nationalist (including recent conservative variations
thereof) would deny that for themselves and their
type of group (i.e. the nation), nor anyone else who
sees some value or other in nationality. As a matter
of fact no one would seriously claim any more that
nationalities are fixed and permanent or ‘primordial’
(except political entrepreneurs of the recent kind, who
are themselves unwilling to believe that alone with
their own self).
My second comment has to do with those on the
other side of the fence who claim that a shared sense
of (of course constantly constructed) national identity
within borders or some kind of nationality for states
is an indispensable factor of cohesiveness in modern
multiethnic states, a factor that mediates between
extremes of difference and identity on the one hand,
and national absorption of minorities by majorities.12
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It is sometimes claimed that radical multiculturalism
“makes unrealistic demands upon members of the
majority group” when a shared (national) identity
within state borders is denied, rejected and
anathematized. (The same can be coined in terms of
the politics of difference.) It is thus asked rhetorically
whether any reason can be given other than common
membership in a national state for a majority host
nationality of a state to provide rights and benefits to
immigrants when their own states from where they
come do not provide them with any such benefits.
Why shouldn’t the majority help others outside its
borders in the interests of global justice that is
supposed to disregard national state frontiers? Well,
that question shows that the force of the principles
of equal treatment, of aiding in stopping social
injustices, humanitarian assistance and the like, cannot
depend logically, for their validity on a shared national
identity which the assisting well-meaning majority must
somehow establish and have in common with the
immigrant minority groups. It may a practical
prerequisite that smoothes out any recalcitrant voices
(‘why should we help them?’) and a realistic injunction
in terms of pragmatic politics and compromise, but
its ethical force as well as its political validity as a
value of liberal democracy do not depend on the
existence of such a shared national identity.
My final brief comment on the subject concerns
the charge that recent models of deliberative
democracy and active republican citizenship silences
difference and recognition of individuality by being
oppressive. It is oppressive because it sanctions
principles of impartiality and rational argumentation
that are indispensable for reaching a common decision
and the shaping of common ends, thus imposing ideals
of commonality disregarding what the advocates of
difference regard as all importance: precisely this,
i.e. difference. Thus it is an oppressive and unfair
type of citizenship that should not be promoted by
democracies. Cultural, gender, age and other borders
must be retained and sanctioned by state policies.
This issue is further connected to how representatives
should be chosen. Advocates of radical group politics
would prefer, unsurprisingly, their representatives to
be exclusively concerned with advancing each
group’s own interests and claims. They must have
one voice, one vocabulary. Now in answer to this it is
usually said that citizenship, and in particular the
republican one, is the ideal vehicle for speaking many
voices at once, for enunciating a multiple vocabulary
by acknowledging and weighing all sides to a debate.
My point in reply is that strictly speaking,
representatives of groups are not both things at the
same time, as, somehow naively, proponents of
republican citizenship expect them to be, sliding
smoothly between identity borders. These
representatives are not, I believe, completely fixed at
a time, as both one and the other simultaneously, both
group-specific representatives and citizens of the
wider national community: rather, in acting as
representatives using their culture-specific discourse
they are constantly redefining their other capacity,
that is to act as citizens informed by wider concerns.
By doing so they are also redefining the language of
citizenship itself (and vice versa). It is rather a model
of flux that better captures this, rather than a
consolidated one. It is because such dual discourses
are in flux that they are so demanding, frustrating
and time-consuming, and so unpredictable to know
how discussions will turn out.
Such a model of flux, suitably elaborated, may
serve, further, towards an understanding of the
problems associated with the specific type of EU
citizenship and EU governance. What is puzzling and
confusing about current developments in EU-both at
the level of political union and the emergence of a
‘supranational’ community as well as at the level of
‘multiple belonging’ whereby an individual is a triple
entity: a particular national, a state’s citizen and a
EU citizen, all at once-is I believe due to the fact that
the European experiment is a hybrid institutional
arrangement. It reproduces features of the nation-
state as an ultimate, centralized, juridical authority
based on a sort of social contract signed by individuals,
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yet each state was never strictly speaking in a
Hobbesian state of nature vis-à-vis the others. At the
same time, nationality and citizenship get coupled at
one level, and decoupled at another. Nationality is
regarded as valuable, and yet not as ultimate in certain
respects. But these respects get increasingly multiplied
resulting in a loss of any real meaning to the notion of
being an ‘EU citizen’ if you cannot do anything
concrete about it. Their being multiplied makes these
concerns that trump separateness and nationality liable
to engender value-conflicts between different
nationalities, in which case the supranational
community in Brussels and the rest of its institutions
must eventually come to consolidate into a suprastate
(thus replicating the old model that was supposed to
be replaced).
Though I can not claim offering a full picture (only
the direction of some of the problems), I believe that
the trio responsible for the drama of modern separate
nation states–(i) fragmentary, eroded sovereignty with
porous borders, (ii) multiple cultural identities and
fractured senses of individuals, and (ill) a not yet
worked out and consolidated type of real citizenship-
are reappearing on the Union stage of Europe13.
V
Conclusion: A Typology
I shall now present a typology of conflicting
perspectives from which the different strands of our
topic interconnect demanding different approaches.
For reasons of space, I can only offer the bare outline.
First, the issue of the permeability of national
borders (as well as borders within heterogeneous
states) in contemporary conditions of multiculturalism
and globalization involves the following items crossing
hitherto sovereign frontiers technology (and the
attendant problems with environmental protection),
economic resources and power together with capital,
investment and financial policies, the activities of
multinational corporations, cultural influences,
linguistic hegemonies, ethnic multipositioning, moving
workplace and workforce, crime, etc.
Second, social and economic justice involves at
least, political equality (or equality of basic rights),
freedom, income-, resources- and capital- egalitarian
redistribution. Democracy, itself a highly contestable
notion, may involve what has come to be known as a
minimal conception whereby it denotes the resolution
of contests, or it may involve majority rule, electoral
processes, the general will. All these ingredients,
jointly and severally make for a highly unlikely internal
coherence, of course especially if we throw in issues
such as desert and need, etc., in relation to welfare
and related schemes.
Third, the issue of the diminishing effective or real
sovereignty of nation states may be divided in the
following way according to the internal jurisdiction or
the external relations of a state. (A) Internally: (i)
On the one hand, there are tendencies as well as
demands and theoretical justifications for internally
less strong state powers stemming from either
demands in favour of contestatory democracy, or the
ethics of multiculturalism or from the strengthening
of the sphere of civil society. (ii) Alternatively, there
are claims for an internally stronger state power in
certain fields, e.g. education. (B) Externally: (i)
Pushing for an international order containing less
strong states cosmopolitan justice holds the fort. (ii)
In favour of states retaining their stronghold in their
external relations there may be two subdivisions: (a)
reasons in favour of minimally strong states may be
the protection of their citizens’ security irrespective
of outside secessionist voices, or (b) reasons for
externally maximally strong state power may be the
necessity of generating peace, or self-determination,
etc.
Given these, we must then compare the above
subdivisions with respect to what principle of
substantive justice (ethics) we prefer to operate with
and what type of democracy best suits each type of
claim about state power and degree of openness of
borders. Naturally, this typology shows that different
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solutions must be expected in each case. For instance,
privileging accountability or controllability of
government may be afforded within a nation state
but it is unlikely to be feasible in global multiple
networks (controlling crime may be the other way
round).
As I explained at the start, this paper discusses a
certain cluster of interrelated specific issues with a
view to clarifying a more-inclusive basic issue: the
relationship between ethics and politics. It does so by
looking at how justice (ethics) and democracy
(politics) fare with respect to the problem of penneable
national borders in modem globalized conditions.
Pluralism and the presence of persistent irresolvable
moral conflict or clash of duties raise obstacles to the
coherence of liberal democratic politics. But they do
even more so in the international sphere. However,
at least methodologically, I believe that looking at these
problems from the international perspective where
demands of universalistic ethics and cosmopolitan
ideals clash more clearly, deeply and ultimately with
particularistic political ends holds out the promise of
a vantage point from which to survey the field with
more confidence. At the same time, it also affords us
a platform for discussing practical resolutions and
steps to be taken with regard to power asymmetries
and worldwide suffering that we can no longer ignore.
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